We investigate a two-player zero-sum differential game in which the players have an asymmetric information on the random terminal payoff. We prove that the game has a value and characterize this value in terms of dual solutions of some Hamilton-Jacobi equation. We also explain how to adapt the results to differential games where the initial position is random.
Introduction
In this paper we investigate a two-player zero-sum differential game in which the player have an asymmetric information on the random terminal payoff. The dynamics of the game is given by x (t) = f (x(t), u(t), v(t)) , u(t) ∈ U, v(t) ∈ V x(t 0 ) = x 0
where U and V are compact subsets of some finite dimensional spaces, and f : I R N × U × V → I R N is Lipschitz continuous. We consider a finite horizon problem with a terminal time denoted by T . The game starts at time t 0 ∈ [0, T ] from the initial position x 0 . The description of the game involves I ×J terminal payoffs (where I, J ≥ 1): g ij : I R N → I R for i = 1, . . . I and j = 1, . . . , J, a probability p = (p i ) i=1,...,I belonging to the set ∆(I) of probabilities on {1, . . . , I} and a probability q = (q j ) j=1,...,J of the set ∆(J) of probabilities on {1, . . . , J}.
The game is played in two steps: at time t 0 , a pair (i, j) is chosen at random among {1, . . . , I} × {1, . . . , J} according to the probability p ⊗ q ; the choice of i is communicated to Player I only, while the choice of j is communicated to Player II only.
Then the players control system (1) in order, for Player I, to minimize the terminal payoff g ij (x(T )), and for Player II to maximize it. We assume that both players observe their opponent's control. Note however that the players do not know which g ij they are actually optimizing, because they only have a part of the information on the pair (i, j). They can nevertheless try to guess their missing information by observing what their oponent is doing. Indeed, in order to use his information a player necessarily reveals at least a part of it, and any piece of information he reveals can be later exploited by his oponent.
As usual we introduce two value functions associated to this game. We have here to take special care of the way we define the strategies of the players, since this definition has to represent the lack of symmetry in the knowledge of the players.
The upper-value is given by V + (t 0 , x 0 , p, q) = inf
where the α i ∈ A r (t 0 ) (for i = 1, . . . , I) are I random strategies for Player I, the β j ∈ B r (t 0 ) (for j = 1, . . . , J) are J random strategy for Player II and E α i β j g ij X t 0 ,x 0 ,α i ,β j T is the payoff associated with the pair of strategies (α i , β j ) for the terminal payoff g ij : these notions are explained in the next section. The key point in the definition is that Player I chooses his strategy α i (i = 1, . . . , I) according to the value of the index i only, while Player II has a strategy (β j ) which only depends upon the index j. This reflects the asymmetry of information of the players. The sum i j p i q j . . . is the expectation of the payoff when the pair (i, j) is chosen according to the probability p ⊗ q, where p = (p 1 , . . . , p I ) and q = (q 1 , . . . , q J ).
The lower-value is defined by the symmetric formula:
Obviously we have
for any (t 0 , x 0 ) ∈ [0, T ] × I R N , any probability p ∈ ∆(I) on {1, . . . , I} and any probability q ∈ ∆(J) on {1, . . . , J}. Our aim is to show that the equality holds, i.e., that the game has a value, and to provide a PDE characterization of the value.
The game studied in this paper is strongly inspired by repeated games with lack of information on one side and on both sides introduced by Aumann and Maschler : see [2] , [21] for a general presentation. Repeated games with lack of information on one side (i.e., I = 1 or J = 1) or on both sides (i.e., I, J ≥ 2) have a value [2] , [17] , in the sense that the averaged n−stage games converge to a limit as n → +∞. This value can be characterized in terms of the value of the game without information. In this paper, we prove the existence of a value for differential games with lack of information on both sides. However, we show in the companion paper [10] that the characterization in terms of game without information does not hold. In that respect, our game is close to stochastic games with incomplete information, as studied in [20] for instance. Although it is known that stochastic games with lack of information on one side have a value when the game is controlled by the informed player only [20] , the general case is still open.
There are several proofs of Aumann and Maschler's result. In order to show that our game has a value, we use a strategy of proof initiated by De Meyer in [12] and later developed in [13, 14, 16] . We first note that the maps V + = V + (t, x, p, q) and V − = V − (t, x, p, q) are convex in p and concave in q (Lemma 3.2). This leads us to introduce, for a generic map w : [0, T ] × I R N × ∆(I) × ∆(J) → I R, the convex Fenchel conjugate w * of w with respect to the variable p and its concave conjugate w with respect to q:
Then the proof of the equality V + = V − runs as follows: we first check (Lemma 4.2) that V − * satisfies a subdynamic programming principle and thus (Corollary 4.3) that (t, x) → V − * (t, x,p, q) is a viscosity subsolution of the (dual) Hamilon-Jacobi (HJ) equation
for any (p, q) ∈ I R I × ∆(J). The map H * is defined through the standard Hamiltonian H of the game
via the relation by H * (x, ξ) = −H(x, −ξ). Note that we assume that Isaacs' condition holds. We recall that the notion of viscosity solutions was introduced by Crandall-Lions in [11] and first used in the framework of differential games in [15] (see also [3] , [4] for a general presentation). We also establish a symmetric result for V + (Corollary 4.4): for any (p,q) ∈ ∆(I) × I R J , the map (t, x) → V + (t, x, p,q) is a viscosity supersolution of the same equation (2) . A new comparison principle (Theorem 5.1) then implies that V + ≤ V − . Since inequality V + ≥ V − is obvious, the game has a value: V + = V − . We also have the following characterization of this value: V := V + = V − is the unique Lipschitz continuous function which is convex in p, concave in q, such that (t, x) → V * (t, x,p, q) is a subsolution of the HJ equation (2) while (t, x) → V (t, x, p,q) is a supersolution of (2) . We call such a function the dual solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
We discuss this terminology below.
We explain in section 6 how to adapt our approach to differential games with lack of information on the initial positions. As previously, the game is played in two steps. At time t 0 , the initial position of the game is chosen at random among I × J possible initial positions x 0 ij according to a probability p ⊗ q where p ∈ ∆(I) and q ∈ ∆(J); the index i is communicated to Player I while the index j is communicated to Player II. Then the players control system (1) in order, for Player I, to minimize a terminal payoff g(x(T )), and, for Player II, to maximize it. The key assumption is that the players observe their opponent's behaviour, but not the state of the system x(·). We prove that this game has a value, which can be characterized as the unique dual solution of some HJ equation
Although there has been several attemps to formalize differential games with lack of information [5, 6, 7, 8] , there are only very few papers in which a game is proved to have a value: see in particular [18] and [19] , which discuss interesting examples. In [9] we consider a game with lack of information on the current position, but with symmetric information. To the best of our knowledge, our result is the first one showing the existence of a value for differential games with asymmetry in the information in a general setting.
The kind of characterization proposed in this paper for the value function (as dual solution of some Hamilton-Jacobi equations) is also new. It relies upon a new comparison principle (Theorem 5.1) stating the following: assume that w 1 and w 2 defined on [0, T ] × I R N × ∆(I) × ∆(J) are convex in p, concave in q, that (t, x) → w 1 (t, x, p,q) is a supersolution of the dual HJ equation (2) for any (p,q) and that (t, x) → w * 2 (t, x,p, q) is a subsolution of this HJ equation for any (p, q). If futhermore w 1 (T, x, p, q) ≤ w 2 (T, x, p, q) for any (x, p, q), then w 1 ≤ w 2 .
Note that the fonction w 2 for instance is a kind of supersolution for our problem. For this reason we call it a dual supersolution of the orginal HJ equation
and we see the HJ equation (2) as a dual one. Let us recall that, although the Fenchel conjugate of a supersolution of (3) is a subsolution of the dual equation (2) (see [1] ), the converse does not hold in general. In fact we show through several examples in [10] that the value function V := V = V − of our game is not a solution of the original HJ equation (3), nor are its Fenchel conjugates V * and V solutions of the dual one (2). The particular structure of our problem leads us to replace the classical notion of sub-and supersolutions by a weaker one, involving families of sub and supersolutions in some dual spaces (see also Lemma 5.4 where an equivalent definition for dual subsolution is discussed).
We complete this introduction by describing the organization of the paper. In section 2, we introduce the main notations: in particular we explain the notions of random strategies and define the value functions of our game. Section 3 is mainly devoted to the proof of the convexity properties of the value functions. In section 4 we show that V − * satisfies a subdynamic programming principle and the dual HJ equation, and give the corresponding results for V + . Section 5 is devoted to the comparison principle and to the existence of a value. In the last section, we extend our results to differential games with lack of information on the initial position.
Definitions of the value functions and notations
Notations : Throughout the paper, x.y denotes the scalar product in the space I R N , I R I or I R J (depending on the context) and | · | the euclidean norm. The ball of center x and radius r will be denoted by B r (x). If E is a set, then 1 E is the indicatrix function of E (equal to 1 is E and to 0 outside of E). The set ∆(I) is the set of probabilities mesures on {1, . . . , I}, always identified with the simplex of I R I :
The set ∆(J) of probability measures on {1, . . . , J} is defined symmetrically.
The dynamics of the game is given by:
Throughtout the paper we assume that
i) U and V are compact subsets of some finite dimensional spaces, ii) f : I R N × U × V → I R N is bounded, continuous, Lipschitz continuous with respect to the x variable, iii) for i = 1, . . . , I and j = 1, . . . , J, g ij : I R N → I R is Lipschitz continuous and bounded.
(5) We also assume that Isaacs condition holds:
for any (x, ξ) ∈ I R N × I R N . We note that the Hamilton-Jacobi equation naturally associated with the dynamics is the so-called primal HamiltonJacobi equation
For any t 0 < t 1 ≤ T , the set of open-loop controls for Player I on [t 0 , t 1 ] is defined by
If t 1 = T , we simply set U(t 0 ) := U(t 0 , T ). Open-loop controls on the interval [t 0 , t 1 ] for Player II are defined symmetrically and denoted by V(t 0 , t 1 ) (and by V(t 0 ) if t 1 = T ).
If u ∈ U(t 0 ) and t 0 ≤ t 1 < t 2 ≤ T , we denote by u | [t 1 ,t 2 ] the restriction of u to the interval [t 1 , t 2 ]. We note that u | [t 1 ,T ] belongs to U(t 1 ).
For any (u, v) ∈ U(t 0 ) × V(t 0 ) and any initial position x 0 ∈ I R N , we denote by t → X the solution to (4). Next we introduce the notions of pure and mixed strategies. The definition of mixed strategies involves a set S of (non trivial) probability spaces, which has to be stable by finite product. To fix the ideas we choose from now on
where B([0, 1] n ) is the class of Borel sets and L n is the Lebesgue measure on I R n . As the reader can easily check, the results presented in this paper do not depend on this particular choice of S.
Definition 2.1 (Pure and random strategies)
A pure strategy for Player I at time t 0 is a map α : V(t 0 ) → U(t 0 ) which is nonanticipative with delay, i.e., there is some τ > 0 such that, for any
A random strategy for Player I is a pair ((Ω α , F α , P α ), α), where (Ω α , F α , P α ) belongs to the set of probability spaces S and α :
with Ω α endowed with the σ−field F α and U(t 0 ) and V(t 0 ) with the Borel σ−field associated with the L 1 distance,
(ii) there is some delay τ > 0 such that, for any v 1 , v 2 ∈ V(t 0 ), any t ∈ (t 0 , T − τ ) and any ω ∈ Ω α ,
We denote by A(t 0 ) the set of pure strategies and by A r (t 0 ) the set of random strategies for Player I. By abuse of notations, an element of A r (t 0 ) is simply noted α-instead of ((Ω α , F α , P α ), α)-, the underlying probability space being always denoted by (Ω α , F α , P α ). In order to take into account the fact that Player I knows the index i of the terminal payoff, a strategy for Player I is actually a I−upplet α = (α 1 , . . . , α I ) ∈ (A r (t 0 )) I .
Pure and random strategies for Player II are defined symmetrically: at time t 0 , a pure strategy β is a nonanticipative map with delay from U(t 0 ) to V(t 0 ), while a random strategy is a map β : Ω β × U(t 0 ) → V(t 0 ), where (Ω β , F β , P β ) belongs to S, which satisfies the conditions:
(ii) there is some delay τ > 0 such that, for any u 1 , u 2 ∈ U(t 0 ), any t ∈ (t 0 , T − τ ) and any ω ∈ Ω β ,
The set of pure and random strategies for Player II are denoted B(t 0 ) and B r (t 0 ) respectively. Elements of B r (t 0 ) are denoted simply by β, and the underlying probability space by (Ω β , F β , P β ).
Since Player II knows the index j of the terminal payoff, a strategy for Player II is a J−uppletβ
endowed with the Borel σ−field associated with the L 1 distance.
Notations : Given any pair (α, β) ∈ A r (t 0 ) × B r (t 0 ), we denote by (8) . We also define the expectation E αβ as the integral over Ω α × Ω β against the probability measure P α ⊗ P β . In particular, if φ : I R N → I R is some bounded continuous map and t ∈ (t 0 , T ], we have
where (u ω , v ω ) is defined by (8) . Note that (9) makes sense because the map
is measurable, where τ a the minimum of the delays for α and β (see condition (ii) in Definition 2.1). Let us start with n = 1. It is enough to show that, for any Borel subsets B 1 and B 2 of U(t 0 , t 0 + τ ) and V(t 0 , t 0 + τ ), the set
is measurable. Let us fixû andv in U(t 0 ) and V(t 0 ). Since α(ω 1 , ·) and β(ω 2 , ·) are nonanticipative with delay τ , the restrictions of α(ω 1 ,v) and
which is measurable since α and β are measurable. So the result holds true for n = 1.
Let us now assume that
is measurable, and let us show that this still holds true for n + 1. It is again enough to show that, for any Borel subsets B 1 and B 2 of U(t 0 , t 0 + (n + 1)τ ) and V(t 0 , t 0 + (n + 1)τ ), the set
is measurable. Let us fix againû andv in U(t 0 ) and V(t 0 ). For any (u, v) ∈ U(t 0 , t 0 + nτ ) × V(t 0 , t 0 + nτ ), we denote byũ andṽ the maps equal to u and v on [t 0 , t 0 + nτ ] and toû andv on [t 0 + nτ, T ]. Note that (u, v) → (ũ,ṽ) is continuous from L 1 to L 1 . Since α and β are nonanticipative with delay
Therefore Ω is the preimage of the set B 1 × B 2 by the map ω → (α(ω 1 , v ω ), β(ω 2 , u ω )) which is measurable as the composition of the mesurable maps ω → (u ω , v ω ) | [t 0 ,t 0 +nτ ] , the map (u, v) → (ũ,ṽ) and the maps α and β. Hence Ω is measurable, and the result is proved.
QED
We now define the payoff associated with a strategyα of Player I and a strategyβ of Player II: Definition of the payoff:
where E α i β j is defined by (9) . Note thatα does not depend on j, whileβ does not depend on i, which formalizes the asymmetry of information.
Definition of the value functions:
The upper value function is given by
while the lower value function is defined by
Let us underline that, because of the special form of the payoff, the value functions defined above cannot be recasted in terms of usual value functions of a zero-sum differential game with perfect information. For instance they do not satisfy the standard dynamic programming principle, as we show in the companion paper [10] .
Convexity properties of the value functions
The main result of this section is Lemma 3.2 which states that the value functions are convex in p and concave in q. We also investigate some regularity properties of the value functions. Proof : We first note that the Lipschitz continuity of V − and V + with respect to p and q just comes from the boundness of the g ij . Using standard arguments, one easily shows that, for any
Hence for any pair of strategies (α,β)
is C−Lipschitz continuous for some constant C independant of t ∈ [0, T ], of p ∈ Σ(I) and of q ∈ ∆(J). From this one easily deduces that V + and V − are C−Lipschitz continuous with respect to x (see for instance [15] ).
We now consider the time regularity of V − and V + . We only do the proof for V − , since the case of V + can be treated similarly. Let x 0 ∈ I R N , (p, q) ∈ ∆(I) × ∆(J) and t 0 < t 1 < T be fixed. Letβ = (β j ) ∈ (B r (t 0 )) J be −optimal for V − (t 0 , x 0 , p, q) and α ∈ A r (t 1 ). Let us define, for any j = 1, . . . , J,β j ∈ B r (t 1 ) and α ∈ A r (t 0 ) by setting (for someū ∈ U fixed)
= Ω β j and u ∈ U(t 1 ), and
We note that, for any α ∈ A r (t 1 ) and j = 1, . . . , J, we have
Therefore, for anyα = (α i ) ∈ (A r (t 1 )) I , we have
(where L is also a Lipchitz constant for the g i ), becauseβ is −optimal for V − (t 0 , x 0 , p, q). Since this holds for anyα = (α i ) ∈ (A r (t 1 )) I and any > 0, we get
The reverse inequality can be proved in a similar way: we choose some −optimal strategyβ = (β j ) ∈ (B r (t 1 )) J for V − (t 1 , x 0 , p, q) and we extend it to a strategy (β j ) ∈ (B r (t 0 )) J by setting (for somev ∈ V fixed)
Then similar estimates as above show that, for anyα ∈ (A r (t 0 )) I we have
from the −optimality ofβ for V − (t 1 , x 0 , p, q). Then we get Remark : This result is well-known for repeated games with lack of information. The procedure we use in the proof is usually called "splitting": see [21] for instance.
QED

Proof of Lemma 3.2:
We only do the proof for V + , the proof for V − can be achieved by reversing the roles of the players. One first easily checks that
Hence q → V + (t, x, p, q) is concave for any (t, x, p). We now prove the convexity of V + with respect to p.
We can assume without loss of generality that p λ i = 0 for any i (because p λ i = 0 implies that p 0 i = p 1 i = 0, so that this index i plays no role in our computation). We now define the strategyα λ = (α λ i ) ∈ (A r (t)) I by setting 
) belongs to the set of probability spaces S and that α λ i belongs to A r (t 0 ) for any i = 1, . . . , I.
The interpretation of the strategyα
becauseα 0 andα 1 are − optimal for V + (t, x, p 0 , q) and V + (t, x, p 1 , q) respectively. Therefore
which proves the desired claim because is arbitrary.
QED
The convexity properties of the value functions leads naturally to consider their Fenchel conjugates. Let w : [0, T ] × I R N × ∆(I) × ∆(J) → I R be some function. We denote by w * its convex conjugate with respect to variable p:
For instance V − * and V + * denote the convex conjugate with respect to the p−variable of the functions V − and V + . For a function w = w(t, x,p, q) defined on the dual space [0, T ] × I R N × I R I × ∆(J) we also denote by w * its convex conjugate with respect top defined on [0, T ] × I R N × ∆(I) × ∆(J):
In a symmetric way, we denote by w = w (t, x, p,q) the concave conjugate with respect to q of w:
The subdynamic programming
The main result of this section is that V + and V − * are subsolution of the dual HJ equation. To fix the ideas, we study here the case of V − * , and explain at the very end of the section how we deduce the symmetric results for V + .
Lemma 4.1 (Reformulation of V − * )
We have
Proof of Lemma 4.1: Let us denote by z = z(t, x,p, q) the right-hand side of the equality. We first claim that z is convex with respect to p.
Proof of (12): The proof mimics the proof of the convexity of V + . Let (t, x, q) ∈ [0, T )×I R N ×∆(J),p 0 ,p 1 ∈ I R I , λ ∈ (0, 1) and (β 0 j ) ∈ (B r (t)) J and (β 1 j ) ∈ (B r (t)) J be −optimal for z(t, x,p 0 , q) and z(t, x,p 1 , q) respectively ( > 0). Let us setp λ = (1 − λ)p 0 + λp 1 . We define the strategies β λ j ∈ B r (t) by setting
and (β λ j ) ∈ (B r (t 0 )) J . For any α ∈ A r (t), we have by using the convexity of the map (s i ) → max i {s i }:
because β 0 and β 1 are −optimal for z(t, x,p 0 , q) and z(t, x,p 1 , q) respectively. Hence
Next we show that V − * = z. Indeed we have by definition of z:
In this last expression, the sup p is attained bŷ
for which all the arguments of the min i are equal. Hence
Since we have proved that z is convex with respect top, we get by duality V − * = z * * = z.
QED
Lemma 4.2 (Sub-dynamic principle for V − * )
We have for any (t 0 , x 0 ,p, q) ∈ [0, T )×I R N ×I R I ×∆(J) and any t 1 ∈ (t 0 , T ],
,p, q) .
Proof : Let us denote by V − * 1 (t 0 , t 1 , x 0 ,p, q) the right-hand side of the above inequality. Arguing as in Lemma 3.1 one can prove that V − * 1 is Lipschitz continuous with respect to x. We also note that Player I can play in pure strategies in V − * : Namely
for any (t, x,p, q) ∈ [0, T ) × I R N × I R I × ∆(J). Indeed, we have from Lemma 4.1 that
Hence the inequality "≥" in (13) is obvious because A(t) ⊂ A r (t). To prove the reverse inequality we first note that, for any α ∈ B r (t 0 ) and for any ω 1 ∈ Ω α , α(ω 1 , ·) belongs to A(t 0 ). Let us fix (β j ) ∈ (B(t)) J . We have, from the convexity of (s i ) → max i {s i },
Taking the infimum over (β j ) ∈ (B(t)) J gives (13).
Let > 0 and β 0 ∈ B(t 0 ) be some pure −optimal strategy for V − * 1 (t 0 , t 1 , x 0 ,p, q). For any x ∈ I R N , we can find some −optimal strategyβ x = (β x j ) ∈ B r (t 1 ) for Player II in the game V − * (t 1 , x,p, q) . From the Lipschitz continuity of the map
and of y → V − * (t 1 , y,p, q), β x is also (2 )−optimal for V − * (t 1 , y,p, q) if y ∈ B r (x) for some radius r > 0. Using the fact that f is bounded, one can show that the reachable states from (t 0 , x 0 ) by using the differential equation (1) is bounded, and contained in some ball B R (0). Let us set M = f ∞ and let us fix σ > 0 small such that M σ ≤ r/2. Then we chose (x l ) l=1,···,l 0 such that l 0 l=1 B r/2 (x l ) contains the ball B R (0). Let (E l ) l=1,...,l 0 be a Borel partition of B R (0) such that, for any l, E l ⊂ B r/2 (x l ). We set
and P l j = P β l j for j = 1, . . . , J and l = 1, . . . , l 0 . We choose some delay τ ∈ (0, σ] common to all the strategies β l j . We note for later use that, if for some controls (u, v) ∈ U(t 0 ) × V(t 0 ) and for some l, we have X ,p, q).
(14) Let us now define a new strategyβ = (β j ) ∈ (B r (t 0 )) J in the following way: set
and, for any ω = (ω 1 , . . . , ω l 0 ) ∈ Ω β j and u ∈ U(t 0 ),
For any pure strategy α ∈ A(t 0 ), we have:
whereα ∈ A(t 1 ) is defined bỹ
the controls (ū,v) being the pair associated with (α, β 0 ) as in (8) . Hence
(because of the convexity of the map s = (s i ) → max{s i })
From this we conclude easily that
QED where 1 (h) → 0 as h → 0 + . Diviving the last inequality by h > 0 and letting h → 0 + gives
Then we let → 0 + , take the minimum over v ∈ V and use (16) to get the desired inequality:
QED
To state the symmetric results for V + , we only need to note that
which is of the same form as V − when one changes the roles of the Players.
In particular the convex Fenchel conjugate of (−V + ) with respect to q, i.e., −V + (−q), satisfies a subdynamic programming principle and is therefore a subsolution of some associated Hamilton-Jacobi equation. From this we easily deduce the 
Hence V + is a supersolution of the dual Hamilton-Jacobi equation (15) .
Remark : We use here Isaacs assumption (6) . Indeed, if V − * is a subsolution of the HJ equation (15) with H * (x, ξ) = inf u sup v f (x, u, v).ξ, V + is actually a supersolution of (15) with a Hamiltonian H * defined by H * (x, ξ) = sup v inf u f (x, u, v).ξ.
Existence of the value and solutions of the primal/dual HJ equations
In this section we prove that our game has a value: V + = V − . This value can be characterized in terms of dual solutions of some HJ equations.
The key argument for this is the following comparison principle, that we state for later use for a general Hamiltonian H. We assume that H : I R N × I R N → I R is continuous and we suppose that there is a constant C such that, for any x 1 , x 2 ∈ I R N and θ ≥ 0,
Let us point out that the map H defined by (6) satisfies the above assumptions under conditions (5) on the dynamics.
Recall that, for any map w = w(t, x, p, q) defined on [0, T ]×I R N ×∆(I)× ∆(J), w * denotes the convex Fenchel conjugate of w with respect to p, while w denotes its concave Fenchel conjugate with respect to q.
We now consider a Hamilton-Jacobi equation of the form:
We say that a function w : (20) if w is Lipschitz continuous, convex with respect to p and concave with respect to q and if, for any (p,q) ∈ ∆(I) × I R J , (t, x) → w (t, x, p,q) is a supersolution of the dual HJ equation
where H * (x, ξ) = −H(x, −ξ). In a symmetric way, w is a dual supersolution of the HJ equation (20) if w is Lipschitz continuous, convex with respect to p and concave with respect to q and if, for any for any (p, q) ∈ I R I × ∆(J), (t, x) → w * 2 (t, x,p, q) is a subsolution of the dual HJ equation (21) . We say that w is a dual solution of (20) if w is at the same time a dual subsolution and a dual supersolution of (20) . (20) . We assume that for any (x, p, q) ∈ I R N ×∆(I)×∆(J),
Remarks:
1. We cannot compare w 1 and w * 2 at time t = T . So this result is not an application of the classical comparison principle.
2. It is known that, if w 2 is a supersolution of the HJ equation (20) , then w * 2 is a subsolution of the dual HJ equation (21) (see for instance [1] . The converse does not hold true in general, and so we cannot rephrase the asumptions in term of sub-and supersolutions of (20) for w 1 and w 2 . However it turns out that w 2 for instance is a supersolution at "some suitable points", related with its convexity property with respect to p. We explain this more precisely in Lemma 5.4 below.
3. The result can be extended to bounded uniformly continuous subsolutions by standard techniques (see [3] for instance).
The comparison principle is proved at the end of the section. Let us now state the main result of this paper:
Theorem 5.2 (Existence of the value)
Assume that conditions (5) on f and on the g i hold and that Isaacs assumption (6) is satisfied. Then we have
Proof of Theorem 5.2: From Lemma 3.1 V − and V + are Lipschitz continuous. From Lemma 3.2, we know that V + and V − are convex with respect to p and concave with respect to q. Corollary 4.3 states that, for any (p, q) ∈ I R I × ∆(J), V − * (·, ·,p, q) is a subsolution of the dual HJ equation (15) . Hence V − is a dual supersolution of (7). Corollary 4.4 states that V + (·, ·, p,q) is a supersolution of the HJ equation (15) for any (p,q) ∈ ∆(I) × I R J , and therefore a dual subsolution of (7). Since V + (T, ·, p, q) = V − (T, ·, p, q) = i,j p i q j g ij , the comparison principle states that V + ≤ V − . But the reverse inequality always holds. Hence V − = V + and the game has a value.
QED
The above proof also shows the (7), such that V (T, x, p, q) = ij p i q j g ij .
We complete this section by an equivalent formulation of the notion of dual supersolution. Although the result is not needed in the rest of the text, we think that it can help to enlighten the notion. (i) w is a dual supersolution of (20) .
(ii) for any q ∈ ∆(J), for any test function φ = φ(t, x, p) which is C 1 and convex in p, and such that
has a strict global minimum at some point
Remarks :
1. This result means that a dual supersolution of (20)-originaly defined in terms of subsolution of the dual HJ equation-is indeed a supersolution of the primal HJ equation (20) in weak sense. However it is not a classical supersolution. For instance, if I = 1, f = f (u, v) and g j (x) = a j .x for some a j ∈ I R N (j = 1, . . . , J), then we prove in [10] that
where h(p) = H( j p j a j ) and Cav(h) is the concave hull of h with respect to p ∈ ∆(I). Then
with a strict inequality in general. In particular, V − is not a classical supersolution of the primal HJ equation.
2. Note carefully that we require the minimum w(t, x, p, q) − φ(t, x, p) at (t 0 , x 0 , p 0 ) to be strict. This point is absolutely crucial for the equivalence. It is related with similar definition in repeated games, where some function has to be tested only at extreme points (see [16] ). Let us point out that a general minimum of w − φ cannot not be made artificially strict by substracting |(t, x, p) − (t 0 , x 0 , p 0 )| 2 to φ (as is usually done in viscosity solutions) because one then looses the convexity of φ with respect to p.
3. A symmetric result holds for subsolutions: w is a dual subsolution of (20) if and only if, for any p ∈ ∆(I), for any test function φ = φ(t, x, q) which is C 1 and concave in q, and such that w − φ has a strict global maximum at some point (t 0 , x 0 , q 0 ) ∈ [0, T ) × I R N × ∆(J), we have
Proof of Lemma 5.4 : Let us first assume that w is a dual supersolution of (20) . Let q ∈ ∆(J), φ = φ(t, x, p) be a test function which is C 1 and convex in p, and such that w − φ has a strict global minimum at some point (t 0 , x 0 , p 0 ) ∈ [0, T ) × I R N × ∆(I). This means that
for any (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T ]×I R N ×∆(I), with an equality only at (t 0 , x 0 , p 0 ). By using the fact that the minimum of w −φ is strict and standard perturbation argument (consisting in replacing φ by φ + |p| 2 if necessary), we can assume that φ is strictly convex in p. Then φ * is differentiable in t and x and one easily checks that
for anyp ∈ I R I , p being the unique element of the subdifferential of φ * (t 0 , x 0 , ·) atp. Letp 0 belong to the subdifferential with respect to p of w at (t 0 , x 0 , p 0 ).
Then inequality (23) shows thatp 0 belongs to the subdifferential of φ with respect to p at (t 0 , x 0 , p 0 ). Since w and φ are convex in p, we have
We note that (23) can be rewritten as
Taking the sup over p ∈ ∆(I) and taking into account (25) gives
Therefore (t, x) → w * (t, x,p 0 , q) − φ * (t, x,p 0 ) has a maximum at (t 0 , x 0 ). Since w * is a subsolution of the dual HJ equation, we have
which implies the desired inequality (22) thanks to (24).
Conversely, let us assume that (ii) holds. Let φ be a C 1 test function such that (t, x) → w * (t, x,p 0 , q) − φ(t, x) has a local minimum at (t 0 , x 0 ) for some (p 0 , q) ∈ I R I × ∆(I). Without loss of generality, we can assume that this minimum is a global one and that φ(t 0 , x 0 ) = w * (t 0 , x 0 ,p 0 , q) (see [3] ). Letφ(t, x,p) = φ(t, x) ifp =p 0 andφ(t, x,p) = +∞ otherwise. Theñ φ ≥ w * (·, ·, ·, q) on [0, T ] × I R N × I R I , with an equality at (t 0 , x 0 ,p 0 ). Thus, by duality,
with an equality at (t 0 , x 0 , p 0 ) for any p 0 ∈ ∂w * (t 0 , x 0 ,p 0 , q) (where ∂w * (t 0 , x 0 , ,p 0 , q) denotes the superdifferential of the convex functionp → w * (t 0 , x 0 ,p, q) atp 0 ). Hence (t, x, p) → w(t, x, p, q) − (p.p 0 − φ(t, x)) has a minimum at (t 0 , x 0 , p 0 ) for any p 0 ∈ ∂w * (t 0 , x 0 ,p 0 , q). In order to get a strict minimum, we have to introduce some perturbation term. Let γ > 0, > 0 and (t , x , p ) be a point of minimum of w − ψ ,γ , where
Then (t , x , p ) converges (up to some subsequence) to (t 0 , x 0 , p 0 ) for some p 0 ∈ ∂w * (t 0 , x 0 ,p 0 , q) as → 0 + (we use here the penalization term in γ). Moreover, we havẽ
for any (t, x, p) = (t , x , p ), with an equality at (t , x , p ). This means that w −ψ has a strict minimum at (t , x , p ). Sinceψ is still convex in p we get from assumption (ii) that
Using the definition ofψ and letting → 0 + , we then obtain
which proves that w is a dual supersolution of (20) .
Proof of Theorem 5.1: We follow the proof of Theorem 3.7 in [3] . Let us argue by contradiction, by assuming that there is some (t 1 , x 1 , p 1 , q 1 )  such that w 1 (t 1 , x 1 , p 1 , q 1 ) > w 2 (t 1 , x 1 , p 1 , q 1 ) . This means that, for some σ > 0, we have sup t,x,p,q
We now use the standard method of separation of variables. In order to avoid burdensome details, we do the proof under the additional assumption that there is some R > 0 such that w 1 (t, x, p, q) ≤ w 2 (t, x, p, q) for any (t, x, p, q) with |x| ≥ R. This assumption can be omitted by using penalization arguments at infinity (see [3] for the details). Let > 0 be fixed. From our assumption, the map
(27) has a maximum over [0, T ]×I R N ×∆(I)×∆(J) and we denote by (t , x , s , y , p , q ) such a point of maximum. From usual arguments in [3] , we have t < T and s < T for small because w 1 (T, x, p, q) ≤ w 2 (T, x, p, q) and w 1 and w 2 are Lipschitz continuous. Moreover
Since, for (s, y) = (s , y ), (t , x , q ) is a maximum in (27) we have
for any (t, x, q), with an equality at (t , x , q ). Letq belong to the superdifferential ∂ + q w 2 (s , y , p , q ) of w 2 with respect to q at (s , y , p , q ). Then the above inequality shows thatq ∈ ∂ q w 1 (t , x , p , q ). From the concavity of w 1 and w 2 with respect to q, we have
and w 2 (s , y , p ,q ) = q .q − w 2 (s , y , p , q ) , so that w 1 (t , x , p , q )−w 2 (s , y , p , q ) = w 2 (s , y , p ,q )−w 1 (t , x , p ,q ) .
Combining (29) with (30) then gives q.q − w 1 (t, x, p , q) ≥ w 1 (t , x , p ,q ) + q.q − w 2 (s , y , p , q) − w 2 (s , y , p ,q ) − 1 |(t, x) − (s , y )| 2 − |(t , x ) − (s , y )| 2 − σ(t − t) .
Taking the infimum over q in the above expression then gives w 1 (t, x, p ,q ) ≥ w 1 (t , x , p ,q ) − 1 |(t, x) − (s , y )| 2 − |(t , x ) − (s , y )| 2 − σ(t − t) .
So (t, x) → w 1 (t, x, p ,q ) − − |(t,x)−(s ,y )| 2 + σt has a minimum at (t , x ).
Since w 1 (·, ·, p ,q ) is a supersolution of the HJ equation (20), we get σ + 2 (s − t ) + H * x , 2 (y − x ) ≤ 0 .
We now argue in a symmetric way for w 2 . Since (s , y , p ) is a maximum in (27), we have w 2 (s, y, p, q ) ≥ w 2 (s , y , p , q ) + w 1 (t , x , p, q ) − w 1 (t , x , p , q ) − 1 |(t , x ) − (s, y)| 2 − |(t , x ) − (s , y )| 2 (32) for any (s, y, p) ∈ [0, T ] × I R N × ∆(I). Letp belong to the subdifferential ∂ − p w 1 (t , x , p , q ) of w 1 with respect to p at (s , y , p , q ). Then the above inequality shows thatp ∈ ∂ − p w 2 (s , y , p , q ). Therefore we have as above w 2 (s , y , p , q ) − w 1 (t , x , p , q ) = w * 1 (t , x ,p , q ) − w * 2 (s , y ,p , q ) . 
Computing the difference between (31) and (33) and using the assumption (19) on H (recall that H * (x, ξ) = −H(x, −ξ)) gives
which is in contradiction with (28) as → 0 + .
6 The case of lack of information on the initial position
In this section we investigate a two-player zero-sum differential game in which the Players have some private information on the random initial position. The dynamics of the game is still given by x (t) = f (x, u(t), v(t)) , u(t) ∈ U, v(t) ∈ V
where U , V and f satisfy (5). The terminal time of the game is denoted by T and the payoff is a terminal payoff g(x(T )) where g : I R N → I R is Lipschitz continuous and bounded. The game starts at time t 0 ∈ [0, T ]. The description of the game involves I × J initial positions x 0 ij , i = 1, . . . , I, j = 1, . . . , J, a probability p ∈ ∆(I) and a probability q ∈ ∆(J). As before, the game is played in two steps: at time t 0 , the pair (i, j) is chosen according to the probability p ⊗ q, the index i is communicated to Player I only and the index j to Player II only.
Then the players control system (34) with initial position x 0 ij in order, for Player I, to minimize the terminal payoff g(x(T )), and for Player II to maximize it. The players observe their oponent's behavior, and try to deduce from this behaviour their missing information. They cannot compute the actual position of the system in general.
As before we define the upper and lower value functions associated to this game. For this we introduce the new state of the system: x = (x ij ), which denotes the I × J−uplet of possible positions. The upper-value is given for t 0 ∈ [0, T ), x 0 = (x 0 ij ) ∈ I R N IJ , p ∈ ∆(I) and q ∈ ∆(J), by V + (t 0 , x 0 , p, q) = inf Our main result is that the equality holds:
for any (p, q), which means that V − is a dual supersolution of (36). One proves in the same way that V + is a dual subsolution of (36). The comparison Theorem 5.1 then implies that V + ≤ V − . Since the inequality V − ≤ V + is obvious, we get the equality and the characterization of the value function.
QED
